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COMMENTS 
ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION: A PROPER 
ALLOWANCE FOR MEASURING NET 
INCOME?!! 
Walter J. Blum* 
In a recent article in the Michigan Law Review, Douglas A. Kahn 
strives to demonstrate that, given the general postulates of the fed-
eral income tax, accelerated depreciation is a proper allowance for 
measuring net income and should not be classed as a tax expendi-
ture. 1 His defense of accelerated depreciation is unusual if not 
novel, and his presentation is engaging. For anyone who shares my 
view that most tax expenditure stuff is mainly political rhetoric and 
who is sympathetic to my position that our tax system is far too 
harsh in taxing income from capital investments, a new plug for ac-
celerated depreciation is not unwelcome. The Kahn analysis, I con-
fess, can be seductive: there is comfort in being assured that 
accelerated depreciation, usually advocated to encourage greater in-
vestment in certain types of assets, is consistent with the neutrality 
principle for taxing income. I write, however, not to praise the effort 
of an ally but to show why it is misleading - or just plain wrong. 
First a word about the notion that I refer to as the "neutrality 
principle" in designing the base of an income tax. The principle is 
not very refined or profound. It perhaps is best grasped as a guide 
for distinguishing between rules that can be justified by an articu-
lated broad concept of personal income during the reporting year 
and rules that go beyond such a broad concept and are more 
favorable to those taxpayers who are affected. The former type of 
rules might be regarded as consistent with the neutrality principle; 
the latter type might be viewed as being justified not on tax princi-
ples but on economic or social considerations that lie outside the 
broad conception of income. In recent years these more favorable 
rules are often labelled "tax expenditures" - that is, they are seen as 
subsidies disbursed by government through the income tax system. 
• Wilson-Dickinson Professor of.Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1939, J.D. 1941, Uni-
versity of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. Kahn, Accelerated .Depreciation -Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring 
Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. l (1979). 
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Another preliminary note is in order. Accelerated depreciation 
has frequently been defended on the ground that, in a noninflation-
ary world, machinery and buildings usually produce greater net in-
come - meaning revenues less expenses - in their earlier years of 
use. Because net earnings decline, such assets lose value faster in the 
earlier as compared to the later years in which they are in service. 
Kahn does not rest his position on this relationship either as an as-
sumption or as a fact. On the contrary, the model for his analysis of 
cost recovery or depreciation deductions is an asset that yields a 
steady stream of annual net income during its use by the taxpayer. It 
is important to keep this somewhat narrow foundation in mind. 
Kahn begins his analysis of cost recovery by examining payments 
to annuitants. The question addressed is one of theory: putting 
aside the actual tax rules, which seem to reflect special social or po-
litical concerns about the treatment of annuitants, how are the rela-
tive magnitudes of the cost recovery component and the interest 
component in level payments received by an annuitant to be deter-
mined? This challenge is posed by the existence of an income tax 
that, stated over-generally, reaches only the interest factor and leaves 
untouched the cost recovery factor. An annuitant not subject to an 
income tax would be unconcerned with the question as framed - to 
him all d,ollars in a particular payment would be exactly alike. 
To illustrate the central income tax issue, Kahn deals with a 
three-year annuity contract, purchased for a lump sum, entitling the 
annuitant to one dollar at the end of each of the three years regard-
less of whether he survives.2 If the annuity writing company com-
putes premiums on the premise that it will pay six percent interest, 
compounded annually, on funds available to it, then the lump sum 
price of the annuity will be approximately $2.67. This amount is the 
present value of one dollar per year, receivable at the end of each of 
three years, discounted at six percent. The essence of the transaction 
is that the annuitant is giving up $2.67 now to receive a total of $3.00 
over the next three years - which means that he will be getting 33¢ 
in aggregate for allowing the annuity company to use his funds. The 
tax question is one of timing: when is the 33¢ to be reflected in the 
annuitant's income for tax purposes? 
There is, it should be noted, a mirror image of this question when 
the transaction is seen from the perspective of the annuity company. 
If interest payments are deductible in computing taxable income of 
the annuity writer, while repayments of funds invested by annuitants 
2. Id. at 23. 
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are not, then the company must determine how the 33¢ interest fac-
tor in the hypothetical contract is to be spread over the three years. 
The appropriate theoretical resolution of the issue, from the 
viewpoint of both the annuity writer and the annuitant, is beyond 
doubt. Inasmuch as the company is paying interest for use of a sum 
that diminishes over time, the interest calculations must be geared to 
the time spans for which funds are actually available to it under the 
contract; for this reason the company must assume that, whatever the 
rate of interest built into the contract, the interest charge accrues on 
a periodic basis - refined possibly to a daily calculation.3 In the 
hypothetical case the company has the full $2.67 available to it for 
the first year, about two thirds of that amount or $1.78 for the second 
year, and about one third of that amount or 89¢ for the third year. 
The total of 33¢ interest payable over the three-year term of the con-
tract would be accrued or apportioned in roughly the same pattern. 
About three sixths or 16¢ would be charged to first-year operations, 
two sixths or 11 ¢ to second-year operations, and the balance of one 
sixth or 6¢ charged to the final year. 
In tabular form the result would be as follows: 
Total 
Amount Investment Interest 
At close of year Paid Returned Paid 
I $1.00 84¢ 16¢ 
2 $1.00 89¢ 11¢ 
3 $1.00 94¢ 6¢ 
$3.00 $2.67 33¢ 
This pattern is quite familiar to borrowers who repay a mortgage 
loan in level amounts over the period of the indebtedness. The 
mortgagor in effect is in the position of the annuity writer in the 
hypothetical case in that he is paying a uniform rate of interest on a 
diminishing sum made available to him by the mortgagee. If the 
debtor borrows $2.67 to be repaid in equal installments of one dollar 
at the end of each of the next three years, then his cost of borrowing 
will be approximately six percent on an annual compounded basis; 
moreover, the interest component of these dollar payments will de-
cline in the same pattern as that seen in the annuity tabulation. 
All these thoughts, widely accepted, are captured by the notion of 
sinking-fund accounting. Both the mortgagor and the annuity writer 
are in a position resembling that of someone who periodically must 
pay a constant amount into a fund which, augmented by interest at 
an assumed uniform rate, will reach the total sum needed to dis-
3. See id. at 23 n.82. 
June 1980) Comment -Accelerated .Depreciation 1175 
charge a definite obligation on a certain date. The first-year contri-
bution obviously will earn a greater amount of interest during the 
duration of the fund than will the second-year contribution, the sec-
ond-year contribution will earn more than the third, and so on 
through the years. 
Kahn acknowledges these considerations, but goes on to argue 
that there is another way - equally sound - for analyzing level 
annuity payments. The hypothetical three-year annuity, he asserts, 
can be viewed not as a single contract but as three separate con-
tracts.4 Under one contract the annuity company agrees, upon im-
mediate receipt of the premium, to pay the annuitant one dollar at 
the end of a year; under another contract, again upon immediate 
receipt of the premium, to pay one dollar at the end of two years; 
and under the third, likewise upon immediate receipt of the pre-
mium, to pay one dollar at the end of three years. If the assumed 
rate of interest to be paid on funds made available to the annuity 
writer is six percent compounded· annually, then the cost of the first 
contract is one dollar discounted for one year at six percent, or 94¢; 
the cost of the second is one dollar discounted for two years at six 
percent, or 89¢; and the cost of the third is one dollar discounted for 
three years at six percent, or 84¢. The total cost of the three contracts 
remains $2.67 - a result to be expected inasmuch as the three con-
tracts are postulated to be equivalent to the single hypothetical con-
tract. 
From the viewpoint of the company, the shift from one contract 
to three contracts will not change the result: under the assumed con-
ditions the duration for which funds are available to it will remain 
exactly the same. How, then, is it possible that the shift might alter 
matters for the purchasers of annuities? 
The difference, according to Kahn, turns on application of so-
called accounting rules that are generally accepted under our income 
tax. 5 Almost all annuitants are persons who for tax purposes report 
their affairs on the cash receipt method (which, be it noted, is not 
predicated on standard accounting principles but is only a reporting 
method). Assuming that the usual cash method rules are brought to 
bear, the annuitant owning the three contracts would report interest 
on each as the payment came due. In tabular form his reporting 
position would be this: 
4. Id. at 24. 
























The result is a complete inversion of that reached under the sink-
ing-fund analysis. The interest component in each dollar received 
grows rather than diminishes over time. Indeed, the new tabulation 
is merely the earlier sinking-fund tabulation turned upside down. 
Having considered the treatment to be accorded the three sepa-
rate contracts, Kahn goes on to assert that the hypothetical single 
contract can be analyzed as though it consisted of the three individ-
ual contracts.6 It then follows, he argues, that the inverted sinking-
fund pattern is an acceptable way for a cash method taxpayer to re-
port annuity income. This conclusion might be extended to level in-
stallment payments of a loan where borrower and lender have not 
specified an allocation between the interest factor and the repayment 
of principal factor. In that event the interest component would grow 
rather than diminish as time went by. 
Two flaws seriously undermine this approach. 
It is highly unrealistic to assume that a single annuity contract for 
three years is equivalent to three separate contracts for one year 
each. Think of borrowing funds from a bank. Assume that the pre-
vailing rate of interest on an immediate three-year loan is six per-
cent. This does not imply that the prevailing rate for an immediate 
one-year loan is six percent, to say nothing of the rate for a one-year 
loan to be made a year from now or a one-year loan to be made two 
years from today. Recent events in financial markets underscore 
how unlikely it is that these rates will be identical. A similar diver-
sity of interest rates might be expected to prevail in pricing term an-
nuities that start at different dates. 
The other flaw lies in the treatment of the cash accounting 
method. That method, stated generally, allows taxpayers to defer the 
reporting of "earned" interest ( or other types of income) until a cash 
receipt is in hand. The deferral is acceptable for two main reasons 
- administrative ease and financial convenience. An overwhelming 
majority of individuals in fact keep their records on the basis of cash 
receipts and disbursements. Additionally, many taxpayers would 
feel unreasonably burdened if they were compelled to accrue 
6. Id. 
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"earned" items and to pay taxes on them before receiving cash or 
being in a position easily to translate the income into cash. Neither 
of the considerations applies in the annuity situation. Under either 
the sinking-fund or the inverted sinking-fund approach to determin-
ing the allocation of aggregate interest among annual periods, the 
annuitant must make (or rely on) a calculation that goes beyond re-
porting solely on the basis of cash received. And should the annui-
tant be required to use sinking-fund reporting, he already would 
have the dollars in hand that reflect the amount of interest he reports 
for tax purposes. In the illustration, the 16¢ interest in year one re-
sulting from a sinking-fund calculation is amply covered by the one 
dollar received by the annuitant at the end of that year. 
Even. if the annuitant were to buy each of the three separate poli-
cies from a different company, Kahn's pronouncement on the cash 
receipt method of reporting is an unguarded overstatement. He 
leaves the impression that there is something about the cash method 
that puts a seal of approval on deferring the reporting of interest in 
the imagined divided contract situation. To be sure, under existffig 
law the interest credited to annuitants on deferred contracts is not 
reported until the annuity commences to pay out Gust as it is true 
that under existing law annuitants are not subject to a sinking-fund 
calculation of interest, but are given the benefit of a constant ratio 
between interest and cost recovery over the years of receiving pay-
ments). The temporally split contracts envisaged by Kahn, however, 
are less like standard deferred annuities and more like non-interest 
bearing debt obligations issued at a discount. In paying 84¢ to re-
ceive one dollar three years later, for example, the purchaser is in-
vesting 84¢ at six percent interest for three years. The 16¢ difference 
between cost and expected receipt is tantamount to an original issue 
discount which substitutes for periodic interest payments. Tax law 
has long required those who hold certain types of obligations issued 
at a discount to amortize that discount as interest attributable to each 
of the intervening years between issuance and maturity. The law 
currently is wrestling with a similar question regarding nontransfer-
able short-term certificates of deposit which mature in the year after 
issuance. An impartial observer surely would be sagacious in think-
ing that the gimmickry of buying a cascading series of annual de-
ferred annuity contracts would rather quickly be defeated by a rule 
requiring an accrual of interest. Cash receipt reporting, after all, is 
based on a need to accommodate "normal" or "businesslike" trans-
actions. Nothing suggests that it was intended as a carte blanche 
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ticket to avoid taxes by way of arrangements that have no purpose 
other than tax minimization. 
This is not the end of the matter, however. Kahn, in developing 
his thoughts, is primarily interested in defending accelerated depre-
ciation on the neutrality principle. To understand that defense bet-
ter, one perhaps might provisionally accept his conclusion about 
taxing the interest element in an annuity - wrong though it appears 
to be. 
The course by which he gets from annuities to accelerated depre-
ciation is instructive. The connecting link seems to be the treatment 
of prepaid expenses. Kahn presents the case of a five-year business 
fire insurance policy on which the entire premium is paid in ad-
vance. 7 If the annual premium is $1,000, and if the contracting par-
ties agree on a ten percent compounded rate of discount for pre-
payment of coverage for future years, then the discounted total pre-
mium for all five years will be $4,169. Treating the arrangement as 
five separate one-year policies, the paid-in-advance premium for the 
first year will be $1,000, while the discounted premiums will be $909 
for the second-year coverage, $826 for the third, $751 for the fourth 
and $683 for the last. Pursuant to the Kahn analysis, the purchaser 
should be able to deduct these differing amounts in the particular 
year to which the coverage pertains. The result once again is an in-
verse sinking-fund pattern - high deductions for expenses in early 
years, low deductions for expenses in later ones. Obviously the out-
come depends on the assumption that, for tax purposes, the insured 
never need take into account the imputed interest for which he is 
given credit by the insurance company in computing prepaid premi-
ums. 
It almost goes without saying that the weakness of this position 
mirrors that earlier noted in the annuity analysis. Realistically, a 
prepaid five-year insurance policy is not equivalent to a series of five 
prepaid one-year policies. In many instances it is not possible for the 
insured to derive the rate or rates of discount implied in the prepay-
ment arrangement because the insurer's assumptions with regard to 
pricing future insurance risks are not revealed. But even if imputed 
interest could be computed and then were taken into account, the 
case for using an inverted sinking-fund pattern for allocating the in-
surance expense among the years of coverage would be no more de-
fensible. The imputed interest giving rise to a discount for future 
costs should logically be offset in full by imputed interest "earned" 
7. Id. at 38. 
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on the prepaid amounts. And if imputed interest is to be ignored, 
the most coherent plan is to spread the cost of the prepaid premium 
evenly over the years of coverage. 
At last it is time to consider accelerated depreciation. 
For Kahn, only a short step seems to be involved in the move 
from blessing an inverse sinking-fund allocation of prepaid expenses 
to blessing accelerated depreciation. The expenditure to acquire a 
depreciable asset, he implies, is much like that involved in prepaying 
an expense such as insurance. 8 The likeness is perceived more 
clearly if an expenditure for an asset acquisition is treated as an al-
ternative to renting the asset in question. on a year-to-year basis (al-
though the comparative figures need to be adjusted to reflect the fact 
that the rentals include a return to the lessor for his risk-taking in 
acquiring the asset and making it available to the lessee). By treating 
the acquisition of an asset as analogous to prepayment of an ex-
pense, Kahn stakes out a position for applying his temporally seg-
mented contract analysis and thereby (mistakenly) arrives at a 
defense for accelerated depreciation - which can be seen as nothing 
more than a version of the inverted sinking-fund pattern for alloca-
tion of costs among the years. 
Taking this path brings Kahn directly up against the analysis of 
depreciation o.ff ered by Marvin A. Chirelstein in his primer on fed-
eral income taxation.9 Chirelstein argues that on the neutrality prin-
ciple, straight line depreciation is too generous to taxpayers and that 
only sinking-fund depreciation is theoretically correct if it is as-
sumed that the income stream produced by the asset remains con-
stant throughout its life. 10 The theory of sinking-fund depreciation, 
in the words of Kahn, is that "the true depreciation of the [asset] for 
a given year is the difference between the present value of the re-
maining income stream, determined at the beginning of the year, 
and the present value of the remaining income stream, determined at 
the end of that year." 11 The foundation for this proposition is more 
easily grasped if it is assumed, not unrealistically, that the market 
value and thus the cost of acquiring an asset is the present or dis-
counted value of the income stream that the asset is expected to pro-
duce for its owner. Working with an illustration structured by 
Chirelstein, Kahn deals with the case of a machine purchased for 
8. Id. at 39., 
9. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (2d ed. 1979). 
10. Id. at 135. 
1 I. Kahn, supra note 1, at 33. 
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$4,000 at the start of year one.12 The purchaser estimates that the 
machine will produce $1,200 of revenue in a lump sum at the very 
end of each year, for five years, and he does not anticipate that there 
will be any repair or maintenance expenses in operating the machine 
or any salvage value. Under these facts the purchaser's expected rate 
of return on the machine is slightly more than fifteen percent - the 
discount rate that equates the present value of the expected $1,200 
per year income stream and the $4,000 purchase price (and market 
value) of the asset. For convenience it is to be assumed that all other 
potential purchasers of the machine share identical revenue and ex-
pense expectations. Fifteen percent can then be treated as the mar-
ket discount rate associated with ownership of the machine. 
To show how sinking-fund depreciation is computed in this case, 
Chirelstein presents the following schedule: 
Present Value Present Value of Remaining Annual Loss in 
of Investment Payment Present Value 
2 3 4 5 
Start of Year l $4000 $1045 $ 905 S 790 S 687 S 573 
End of Year I 3427 1045 905 790 687 S 573 
End of Year 2 2740 1045 905 790 687 
End of Year 3 1950 1045 905 790 
End ofYear4 1045 1045 905 
End of Year 5 -0- 1045 
Total: $4,000 
In connection with the schedule Chirelstein offers an explana-
tion: "The last column shows the true measure of economic cost 
from year to year and indicates that the correct apportionment 
method is one which starts low and rises . . . . Income is thus higher 
in the earlier years than in the later."13 Recognizing that normally 
there is considerable difficulty in estimating the net income stream 
that will be produced by a business asset (a great understatement), 
and that the income stream often will not remain constant from year 
to year (another notable understatement), Chirelstein concludes: "In 
principle, nevertheless, sinking-fund is the only proper method of 
apportioning the taxpayer's capital investment in accordance with 
the economic cost of use."14 
Kahn's rejection of this reasoning is put succinctly: 
The fallacy in the sinking-fund concept is that it is premised on an 
assumption that the exhaustion of one year's useful life of an asset 
should be offset by the unrealized appreciation in the remaining years 
of life that arises by virtue of the passage of time. Referring back to 
12. Id. at 33. 
13. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 9, at 134-35 (emphasis original). 
14. Id. at 135 (emphasis original). 
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the example above, the last four years of the life of the machine had a 
greater value after the expiration of one year's time because the reve-
nue for those years was discounted one fewer year. But should that 
increase in present value affect the determination of the amount of cost 
to be allocated to the exhaustion of the first year of the machine's use-
ful life? Surely not. The cost of the first year's use is completely unre-
lated to any unrealized appreciation in the value of the right to use the 
machine in later years. 15 
In opposition to the Chirelstein position, Kahn emphasizes that 
"for tax purposes depreciation is a means of allocating a cost that the 
taxpayer incurred in a prior year. The normal means of allocating 
cost for an item of property is to determine what amount the owner 
paid for that item." 16 In the case of a depreciable item, he urges that 
the cost "should be allocated to each year of the asset's use according 
to the amount paid for that year's use: the amount of income that 
the taxpayer initially expected the property to produce in that year, 
discounted to present value as of the date the taxpayer acquired the 
property."17 
Applying this reasoning to the illustrative case, Kahn points out 
that the cost to be allocated to the first year of the machine's use is 
$1,045; subsequent allocations are $905 to the second year, $790 to 
the third, $687 to the fourth, and $573 to the final year. Thus Kahn 
once again arrives at an inverted sinking-fund pattern as an accept-
able means of apportionment - in short, his approach leads to turn-
ing Chirelstein's tabulation precisely upside down. The first year 
result, as might be expected, is similar to that reached by assuming 
the taxpayer had rented the machine for one year and had paid in 
advance for buying the item at the end of that period.' The similarity 
can be extended by envisaging an arrangement consisting of several 
divisible annual rental terms followed by a purchase, all paid up at 
the outset. 18 
The ultimate confusion in the Kahn thesis as to accelerated de-
preciation can now be pinned down. I have already indicated why 
his temporally segmented cost analysis is wrong in respect to allocat-
ing prepaid expenses such as insurance: it simply is unrealistic to 
divide arbitrarily one contract into several on the assumption that 
the terms of each will remain unchanged; it is unsophisticated to as-
15. Kahn, supra note 1, at 34-35. 
16. Id. at 35. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 37. It is interesting to note that Kahn apparently thinks that this result, like the 
result in the matter of prepaid insurance but unlike the result in the matter of annuity pay-
ments, is proper regardless of whether the purchaser r~ports on the cash receipt or the accrual 
method. Depreciation method has always been regarded as independent of reporting method. 
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sume that our tax system - as loosely jointed as it is - will allow a 
taxpayer to ignore imputed interest on prepayments while allowing 
him to claim a discount on those payments for purposes of allocating 
the expense among different years. The same can be said of using a 
temporal segmentation approach to arrive at asset acquisition costs 
that are to be associated with particular years of use. Is there, never-
theless, any force to Kahn's protestation that, under our long-stand-
ing tax concept of depreciation, it is always wrong to base 
depreciation for a particular year on a calculation that takes into 
account the unrealized appreciation in the residual value of the asset 
at the expiration of the year under consideration? It undoubtedly is 
accepted wisdom that the depreciation deduction does not change 
with a rise in the market value of the asset used in producing income. 
Must one conclude therefore that sinking-fund depreciation ulti-
mately is at odds with that accepted principle? 
Sinking-fund depreciation clearly is not compelled by existing 
tax doctrines. It is wrong, however, to attribute this outcome to the 
proposition that unrealized appreciation in the value of an asset is 
not to be taken into account in computing depreciation. Sinking-
fund depreciation need not be explained and justified in terms of 
seeking to correlate the depreciation deduction with the decline in 
the value of an asset during the year - although such a correlation 
will occur under that pattern of depreciation. Another explanation 
of sinking-fund depreciation is equally persuasive and it possibly 
might reduce the confusion into which Kahn has fallen. 
Return again to annuities and think of a five-year annuity, start-
ing immediately, purchased for a lump sum of $4,000. Assume that 
the interest rate factored into the contract by the annuity company is 
slightly more than fifteen percent compounded annually. Payments 
will then be $1,200 a year - a total of $6,000 over the five years. 
Based on the analysis of annuities offered earlier, the theoretically 
"correct" distribution between interest and recovery of cost or in-
vestment will be: 
Year Interest Return of Cost 
I $ 627 $ 573 
2 513 687 
3 410 790 
4 295 905 
5 155 1,045 
$2,000 $4,000 
This, of course, is the sinking-fund pattern (and the figures them-
selves by now should be familiar). 
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Sinking-fund depreciation for an asset is based on the same prin-
ciple and the computation is also the same. Take the illustration of a 
machine with a five-year life and no salvage value, purchased for 
$4,000 and expected to produce net income of $1,200 at the end of 
each year. If the interest ( or discount) rate associated with the 
machine is fifteen percent compounded annually, the distribution of 
the $1,200 between cost recovery and "profit-over-cost" will exactly 
track that governing the five-year annuity. In the annuity situation 
the interest factor reflects the interest credited by the annuity writer. 
In the machine situation the interest factor reflects the loss of income 
which could have been earned by the businessman (at an assumed 
fifteen percent rate) had he elected to invest in another comparable 
opportunity. The key to the sinking-fund principle in all such situations 
is imputation of interest. 
If an interest factor can be isolated and quantified, then sinking-
fund depreciation is theoretically proper because it takes that imput-
able interest into account. A consequence of reflecting such an inter-
est element is to equate the depreciation deduction for a particular 
year with the decline in the value of the asset during the year attrib-
utable solely to the passage of time. This consequence might well 
illuminate the case for using sinking-fund depreciation. Misunder-
standing, however, can arise if the equation is allowed to overwhelm 
the point that the sinking-fund notion ultimately rests on the imputa-
tion of interest. 
In dealing with repayment of loans, the tax system wisely takes 
into account the rate of interest implicitly agreed upon by borrower 
and lender, and in the absence of an express agreement between the 
parties allocating installment payments between principal and inter-
est, the sinking-fund approach is appropriately mandated. In the an-
nuity situation, the sinking-fund approach is theoretically correct; 
but our lawmakers acted on the practical wisdom of not burdening 
annuitants with amounts of taxable interest that start high and then 
decrease. In the case of prepaid expenses, the sinking-fund approach 
has not been prescribed by the law, probably because as a practical 
matter it usually is too difficult to determine the interest rate to be 
imputed for purposes of the computation; in any event, a straight 
line expensing of the prepaid costs is much simpler to handle. In 
connection with machines and real property, the law very sensibly 
has ignored the possibility of confining depreciation to the sinking-
fund model. Only in dealing with an extremely narrow and forced 
set of facts, such as those on which the Chirelstein illustrative case is 
built, can the imputed interest rate associated with acquisition of the 
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asset be derived; and in the real world the facts are almost never so 
tidy. 
In summary: Decelerated or sinking-fund depreciation, which 
necessarily depends on using an imputed interest factor, cannot be 
justified as a general prescription because such an interest factor sel-
dom can be plausibly derived. But, in any case, accelerated or in-
verse sinking-fund depreciation cannot be justified by the neutrality 
principle. Kahn's argument is based on a gross inconsistency. It as-
sumes wrongly that an imputed interest rate can be found for pur-
poses of discounting the magnitude of costs associated with 
particular future years. At the same time it ignores altogether the 
attendant - equally difficult to derive - imputed interest that is 
associated with prepaying future expenses. 
Thus, on the neutrality principle, straight line depreciation gener-
ally is the easiest to justify after all. The case for accelerated depre-
ciation, I conclude, must be rested on some other ground. 
